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Abstract

Koho, Natalie Ruth. M.A. The University of Memphis. 12/2011. Devastated Utopias, or
How to Leave a Legacy: Communist Art & Personality Cults in 20th Century Russia,
China and Cambodia. Major Professor: Dr. Catherine Phipps.

The rise of Marxist regimes altered the stylistic course and purpose of art.
Although a new style, Socialist Realism, was formed to reflect communism's visual
intentions, this style borrowed and adapted older artistic traditions to increase the
reception and understanding of new communist ideologies. The artistic blend of old and
new also reflected a trend within communist leadership; Stalin and Mao particularly
came to resemble powerful monarchs of the previous imperial eras. Although greatly
influence by Maoist thought, the Khmer Rouge communist regime contrasts both the
Chinese and Soviet model by producing an extremely low amount of art and shrouding
its leadership with secrecy. Contemporary art produced after communist decline or
demise reflects a collective loss of identity coupled with new ironic visions of a societal
utopia.
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Introduction

“It is as if a raging tidal wave has swept away all the demons and ghosts.”
~ Mao Zedong, 19551

Ideas are often compared to seeds capable of germinating into a complex and
deeply rooted plant. But perhaps ideas are a force like water, capable of nourishing life
as well as breeding destruction. As water's effect depends on a region's climate and
geography, so ideas have different outcomes depending on the culture and its traditions.
Water is powerful enough to alter a landscape and likewise ideas can alter the course of
society. Water can enrich soil, promoting the growth of indigenous life, and so ideas can
embellish older cultural traditions. Just as the elements of water are ever present in our
environment, the constancy of human innovation endures, endlessly sprung by new
ideas.
The Marxist view of communism proved to be an enormously influential idea of
the twentieth century which toppled dynasties, radically altered societies and affected
global politics. Although Marxist-based governments have proven largely unsuccessful,
what lasting effects remain for cultures transformed by communist ideology? Artwork is
increasingly used by historians and sociologists as a primary source for ascertaining
information about a culture. By examining the artistic style and production before, during
and after communist control in Russia, China and Cambodia, this thesis works to
1

Mao Zedong, 1955 quoted by Francesca dal Lago, “Personal Mao: Reshaping an Icon in
Contemporary Chinese Art,” Art Journal 58 (1999): 60. The statement represents his assessment of cooperativization shortly before launching the Great Leap Forward in 1956.
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illuminate the lingering shadows of communist influence in contemporary Russian,
Chinese and Cambodian society as indicated by their contemporary art.
The collapse of communism in Russia and the increasingly capitalistic policies of
China produced consumerist cultures in both of these societies. The rise of consumerism
and its inherent ironies for communist and post-communist societies is reflected in the
contemporary art of both Russia and China. First in the late 1960s with Russian artists
Komar and Melamid and later through Chinese artist Wang Guangyi with his 1990 work
“Great Criticism,” artists adapted Socialist Realism and Western Pop Art into a highly
ironic, politically charged style referred to as Sots Art for Russian production and
Political Pop for the Chinese. Although Russian Sots Art began within the Soviet regime
by the late 1960s, Western viewers became particularly interested in works of Alexander
Kosolapov, who gained notoriety with the Time Square display of his 1980 work “Lenin
Coca-Cola.” (fig. 1) This work sold in Sotheby's 2009 Contemporary Russian Art sale for
over seventy thousand USD.2 Russian Sots Art specifically applies to a small group of
artists who emigrated to New York from Moscow in the 1970s. Although not initially
understood or embraced by Western audiences, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991
and the end of the Cold War made the socialist imagery of Sots Art non-threatening
symbols. As products of a now bygone era, Sots Art and vestiges of Socialist Realism
became increasingly popular among Western buyers and wealthy Russians.3

2

Sotheby's. 2009 Russian Contemporary Art Sale. Lot 147.
www.sothebys.com/en/catalogues/ecatalogue.html/2009/russian-contemporary-salel09670#/r=/en/ecat.fhtml.L09670.html+r.m=/en/ecat.lot.L09670.html/147/
3

Boris Groys, “Eastern Prophecies,” Alexander Kosolapov: Sots Art (Bielefeld: Kerber Verlag,

2009), 9.
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Figure 1. Alexander Kosolopav. Lenin Coca Cola, 1980. Acrylic on canvas. 107 x
183 cm.

As a major force of Eastern communism, the ideological journey of the People's
Republic of China has served as a constant topic for scholars and critics. Following
Mao's death in 1976, events such as the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989 and
China's rapidly developing economy pique international interest as to the ultimate
outcome of Mao's Sinification of Marxism. Contemporary Chinese art, particularly that
produced in the wake of Tiananmen Massacre, has been gaining value with rising
international demand. Christie's Hong Kong reported a 74% growth in Contemporary
Asian art sales from 2010-2011 sales. Doubling pre-sale estimates, the Asian 20th

3

Century and Contemporary Art Sale in June of 2011 reports realizing $97, 850,000 with
eighteen pieces reportedly breaking world auction records.4
Western Pop Art influenced Chinese artists as early as the 1970s, particularly with
the public display of Andy Warhol's 1973 portrait “Mao” (see fig. 34) and his widely
publicized visit in the early 1980s. Robert Rauschenberg's 1985 Beijing solo exhibit was
also highly influential in challenging the accepted mediums and purpose of art.5 Artistic
communities clung to this fresh Western air, as art production was stifled and stagnant
due to censors and enforced adherence to Socialist Realism. Chinese Pop Art consists of
several styles, including most notably, Political Pop and Cynical Realism. Political Pop is
exemplified by Wang Guangyi's “Great Criticism” from 1990 which received the highest
honor from Chinese critics, the Document Award, at the “First 1990s Biennial Art Fair.”6
This initial critical acclaim and commercial success inspired Wang to carry the “Great
Criticism series” into the twenty-first century. His 2004 work, “Great Criticism: Ferrarri,”
(fig. 2) sold at Christie's Hong Kong for over one million USD in 2008.7 A pioneer of the
Cynical Realism style, the works of Yue Minjun have also garnered immense praise and
value. The 2008 Christie's sale of his 1993 work, “Gweong Gweong” sold for almost
seven million USD.8
4

Christie's, “Christie's Asian 20th Century & Contemporary Art Sales Witnessed the Successful
Integration of Asian Art Markets,” Last modified June 29, 2011. <www.christies.com/features/asian-20thcentury-and-contemporary-post-sale-repo-1639-1.aspx>
5

Huang Zhuan, “The Misread of 'Great Criticism,'” in Contemporary Chinese Art: Primary
Documents, ed. Wu Hung et al. (2008), 168. The Art Institute of Chicago: Art Acess.
6

Huang Zhuan, “The Misread of Great Criticism,” 167.

7

Christie's, “Asian Contemporary Art; Wang Guangyi: Great Criticism Series,” May 10, 2010.
<www.christies.com/features/2010-may-wang-guangyi-great-criticism-series-631-1.aspx>
“Christie's Asian Contemporary Art Sale, Hong Kong,” May 24, 2008. Sale 2602/Lot 167.
<www.christies.com/LotFinder/lot_details.aspx?intObjectID=5078576>
8

“Christie's Asian Contemporary Art Sale, Hong Kong,” ibid, Sale 2602/Lot 157.
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Figure 2. Wang Guangyi. Great Criticism: Ferrari, 2004. Oil on canvas diptych.
300 x 200 cm.

By contrast, Cambodian artwork, despite the 1979 fall of the Khmer Rouge
communist regime and international interest in the nation's genocide experience, has
failed to create much demand. The ancient artistic heritage of Angkor architecture,
however, continues to appreciate in value and draws increasing amounts of international
tourism. Most of working Cambodian artists today survive through tourist purchases of
Angkor temples or deity depiction and idyllic pastoral scenes. While international tourists
marvel at the beauty of the Khmer artistic past, they also visit Cambodia to catch a
glimpse of its dark past of genocide and the “homicidal regime” of the Khmer Rouge.
5

Other than the medieval ruins of Angkor Wat, Cambodia's main cultural attractions
remain the vestiges of Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea, exemplified through the Tuol
Sleng Genocide Museum and Choeung Ek “Killing Fields” located outside Phnom Penh.9
The Khmer Rouge renamed Cambodia 'Democratic Kampuchea', which lasted
from 1975-1979. Based on a Maoist ideology, the regime's social engineering programs
resulted in roughly two million Cambodians deaths due to mass murder, disease or
malnutrition. Many Cambodians initially welcomed the Khmer Rouge troops into the
capitol of Phnom Penh; communist ideology was well known among the urban
population and many hoped the new leaders would bring stability to the nation. The
soldiers consisted primarily of village men and boys from the northeastern provinces, and
their dress of all black garb with a traditional red gingham Khmer krama scarf did not
initially seem foreboding. When ordered, most urban citizens willingly left their homes
with no belongings or food, believing they would return in a few days. Instead they were
transferred to the countryside for re-education. Designated “undesirable,” the regime
forced these urbanites to labor in communal farms reminiscent of Mao's re-education
camps during the Cultural Revolution.10
Democratic Kampuchea sought to turn back time to Year Zero and rebuild an
agrarian utopia, drawing on influences from Maoism. Although Pol Pot and other
important party members had been influenced by Marxism while studying in France or
China, their ideology cannot justly be called Marxist. In the same way that Maoism is not
9

Boreth Ly, “Witnessing Genocide: Vigilance and Remembrance at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek,”
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 18 (2004): 66-8. Cambodia's heritage and monuments of genocide have
received much attention in the international press. For more on genocide tourism, see Zoltan Istvan,
“'Killing Fields' Lure Tourists in Cambodia,” National Geographic Today, January 10, 2003.
<news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/01/0110_030110_tvcambodia.html>
10

Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer
Rouge, 1975-79 (New Haven: Yale, 1996), 9.
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truly Marxist, but rather an adaptation of Leninism-Stalinism, in Democratic Kampuchea
it can be seen as a variation on Maoism.11 Cambodian communism departed from
previous communist models by not enacting a cult of personality for its leader, differing
greatly from the fervor and power of the personality cults of Mao, Stalin and Lenin. The
Khmer Rouge deliberately maintained a degree of mystery around leadership within the
regime to the extent that Pol Pot's prominence only came to light in 1977. Although
historical and cultural reasons help explain Pol Pot's ambiguity and anonymity, ultimately
this divergence from Maoist tradition served Pol Pot well. Following the regime's
overthrow in 1979, Pol Pot managed to escape into the western jungles of Cambodia,
living there in relative obscurity until he died from natural causes in 1998.
The communist quest for a utopia had a particularly tragic effect on Cambodia
and also drastically altered both society and art in Russia and China. Under Stalinist
Russia and Maoist China, art was produced only to verify ideology, thus restricting
personal expression and imposing an ideal upon society. This imposed ideal conflicts
with the rise of consumerism in both Russian and Chinese culture, causing an ironic
reality of life which is reflected in contemporary artwork; consumer goods became the
new societal ideal. In Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea, society was destroyed to such an
extent that contemporary culture continues to seek atonement. Contemporary Cambodian
art struggles with the attainability of a utopia after the trauma of Democratic Kampuchea,
and this unclear ideal is reflected in artists' preference to depict traditional motifs derived
from the medieval Angkor kingdom, the “zenith of Khmer power.”

11

Stuart Schram, “Mao Zedong a Hundred Years On: the Legacy of a Ruler,” The China Quarterly
137 (1994): 127.

7

Methodology & Sources

Collective memory is an effective concept when examining the legacies of
communism in Russia, China and Cambodia, especially “after the end of the Cold War,
and the challenges of coming to terms with war and genocide.”1 Maurice Halbwachs
established the notion that a society can have a collective memory, which “exists … [and]
exerts an influence upon all the functions of individual mentality” as “the state of the
civilization in which we live … present and impose the collective patterns upon our
emotional expressions.”2 Collective memory is exemplified and continuously influenced
by objects of “cultural memory … that is, the texts, rites, images, buildings, and
monuments which are designed to recall fateful events in the history of the collective.”3
By reusing iconography and motifs derived from earlier traditions and political policies,
contemporary artists in Russia and China reflect the lingering cultural influences of
previous regimes and eras. In Cambodia, artists' choice to ignore recent events such as the
1970s genocide reveals the traumatic extent of the former regime's policies which
continue to effect contemporary Khmer society.
The research for this paper is wide ranging in geographic and disciplinary scope,
utilizing artwork in combination with written primary and secondary sources. Drawing
on the scholarship of American, Asian and European historians, art historians,
sociologists and anthropologists, the ultimate goal of this paper is to create a
1

Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective
Memory Studies,” History and Theory 41 (2002): 179.
2

Maurice Halbwachs, “Individual Psychology and Collective Psychology,” American Sociological
Review 3 (1938): 615-6. See also Halbwachs' La Memoire collective (Paris: Presses universitaire de France,
1950).
3

Jan Assman, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” New German Critique 65 (1995): 132,
quoted in Kansteiner, ibid, 182.

8

transnational perspective crossing European-Asian national and regional divides to
investigate the impact of art from communist regimes on both contemporary art and
collective memory. By focusing on three countries, the lasting cultural impact of
communism on art and society can be more fully exposed. By examining Russia and
China, a comparison with strong similarities emerges. Comparisons between Russia and
China are useful in order to fully understand communist China's policies on art
production, as the relationship between the rise of communism in China and its support
by Stalin and the Comintern is well-known.4

Figure 3. Ivanov. May the indestructible friendship of the Soviet and Chinese
people live long and grow stronger! 1951. Soviet propaganda poster. 90 x
65 cm.

4

Steven Heller, Iron Fists:Branding the 20th Century Totalitarian State (London: Phaidon Press,

208) 78.

9

The inclusion of Cambodia in this research is intended to provide an extreme
contrast of communism's effect on art and culture in an entirely different society from
that of Russia or China. The inclusion of Cambodia also enables consideration not only
of how ideas transfer between West and East, but also of the trickle down effect of
crossing borders. Soviet communism developed around a Leninist approach to Marxism,
and the People's Republic of China was based on a Maoist adaptation of LeninismStalinism. The Chinese government acted as the biggest influence and supporter of
Cambodia's Khmer Rouge regime and the Khmer Rouge leaders directly modeled their
own policies from Maoist ideology and programs, such as the Great Leap Forward and
the Cultural Revolution. Once the Khmer Rouge took power, China remained Cambodia's
only Asian ally and trade partner and retained influential advisers and diplomats in
Democratic Kampuchea.5
This research focuses on the existence of a “cult of personality” which surrounded
the communist leaders Lenin, Stalin and Mao. For the purpose of this paper, a
personality cult is an almost mystical adulation for a leader by the masses and is
promoted through state propaganda and visual imagery while calling on traditional
notions of power and divinity. The cult of personality is best understood through a three
tiered analysis: 1. traditional notions or practices of authority and religion in that culture
used by the communist regime; 2. reasons and methods for a regime's active promotion of
a leader cult; 3. postmortem legacy of the cult figure in historical memory as seen in
images created after the regime's demise or collapse.
Artwork is used in this research as a primary source, capable of providing
information about the producing culture, a methodology pioneered by Stefan
5

Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) x.
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Landsberger, the leading scholar on Chinese propaganda posters and their implications.
Francesca dal Lago, a professor and researcher like Landsberger at Leiden University,
builds upon Landsberger by examining Chinese propaganda and contemporary art to
understand Mao's role in contemporary Chinese culture and collective memory. 6 Select
Sovietologists also focus on the correlation of culture and the visual arts, particularly
Victoria Bonnell and Nina Tumarkin. These Harvard historians research the use of
propaganda art to legitimize and solidify Bolshevik and Soviet authority. Bonnell's work,
Iconography of Power, regards art from a “social contextualization” perspective in which
propaganda art reveals the visual and intellectual frame of the viewing citizens, creating
artists and administering officials.7 Tumarkin's earlier work, Lenin Lives!, traces the roots
of Russia's visual culture of authority and religion. Her research exposes Bolshevik's

6

Francesca dal Lago, “Personal Mao: Reshaping an Icon in Contemporary Chinese Art,” Art
Journal. 58 (1999): 48. Dal Lago is an Italian art historian with an international focus, completing her B.A.
in art history at Beijing's Central Academy of Fine Arts and pursuing doctoral studies at New York
University. Her works focus on the intersection and and effects of China's propaganda artistic heritage and
contemporary Chinese art. She approaches artwork as a clue to understanding culture and emphasizes the
important influential effect of Chinese communist art on China's contemporary art and culture. As a postdoctoral researcher for Leiden University's Center for Asian Studies, she has organized international
conferences which highlight visual impacts on a culture's collective memory, such as the 2007 symposium,
“'China' on Disply: Past and Present Practices of Selecting, Exhibiting and Viewing Chinese Visual and
Material Culture.” <www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/scholarship.php?
searchterm=013_chinaOnDisplay.inc&issue=013> She is also involved in art criticism and international
exhibitions of contemporary Chinese art. For an example of her work in this area, see her catalogue essay
for the 2008 Italian exhibit, “China China China!” <www.strozzina.org/chinachinachina/04_lago.htm>
7

Victoria Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin
(Berkely: University of California Press, 1997). Bonnell is a Harvard trained sociologist who favors a
multidisciplinary approach to research by utilizing sources from history, art history, political science and
anthropology. Drawing on themes uncovered by Nina Tumarkin, Bonnell also utilizes ideas derived from
French scholarship on the use of iconography in the French Revolution. Iconography of Power draws on
Bonnell's examination of around 5,500 posters from the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford, the
Russian State Library collection and the Museum of Revolution in Moscow, as well as collections at the
Imperial War Museum, the Victoria and Albert Museum and the British Museum in London. The Hoover
collection houses around 3,000 Soviet posters and the Russian State Library Poster Collection includes
some 400,000 posters, catalogued in 1995. Although, limited scholarship on the role of Soviet posters
exists in English, but good sources are Igor Golomstock's Totalitarian Art, and Boris Groys' The Total Art
of Stalinism. Extensive Soviet scholarship exists but tends to lack any quest into implications beyond
political correctness..
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ability to manipulate this tradition in order to maintain power, thereby continuing the
tradition of authoritarian cults of personality. 8
Additional sources include the accounts of contemporary artists as available in
English by reliable English language news publications. The use of journalist sources is
confined to the New York Times and BBC which have reported generously on Chinese
contemporary art and events pertaining to Cambodia. Information from Cambodian
English language journalism, such as Angkor, Cambodia Daily, or Phnom Penh Post, are
also utilized as these sources are recommended and sited by Ingrid Muan's Reyum
Institute.9 Exhibition catalogues also proved extremely useful in providing both high
quality examples of contemporary art work as well as statements from the artists, often in
both the original language and English.
The artwork analyzed for the scope of this topic includes Russian Orthodox icons,
with examples selected from the Kremlin's and the British Museum's online collections.
8

Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia (Harvard University Press, 1997).
Tumarkin is a foremost Western scholars regarding the Lenin cult in Soviet Russia. Lenin Lives! began as
her Harvard University doctoral dissertation, was published to wide acclaim in 1983 and eventually
republished in edited form in 1997. Tumarkin traces roots of the Soviet Lenin cult back to Orthodoxy's
promotion and intermingling of saint and tsar veneration among the peasantry, resulting in a cultural
phenomenon known as “naive monarchism.” Her work also examines and highlights the conscious
promotion of Lenin's cult by the Bolsheviks, begun with fervor at the leader's untimely death. According to
Tumarkin, the success of Bolshevik propaganda was a key factor in the party's ability to gain and maintain
power. Bolshevik political posters utilized religious symbolism, themes and iconography to relay Lenin's
authority to the masses. Tumarkin's scholarship has allowed her important position within academia as well
as in the political sphere. She has served as a fellow for Harvard's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian
Studies for twenty-five years and also served as special adviser to the National Security Council in the
1980s. She was the only female Sovietologist to advise President Ronald Reagan during his presidency and
initial summit meetings with Mikhail Gorbachev.
9

Western scholarship on Cambodia remains scarce with most historical research focused on French
colonialism or the Khmer Rouge regime. Even less scholarship exists on Cambodian art, making Columbia
University art historian, Ingrid Muan's 2001 doctoral dissertation, “Citing Angkor: Cambodian Arts in the
Age of Restoration, 1918-2000, ” an invaluable source. Muan provides the only English language history
of Cambodian arts in the twentieth century. Muan strove to bring international attention to Cambodia's
plight both in the academic arena as well as the contemporary art world. She criticizes Western study of
modern art as overly Euro-centric, with scholarship firmly limited to European activity and the transfer to
New York. This paper attempts to follow in Muan's vein firstly by highlighting Cambodia through its
inclusion in a transnational, Eurasian study, and secondly by placing contemporary Cambodian arts in a
historical framework within the global art market.
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For the examination of Soviet propaganda posters, the meticulously compiled online
database of the private collector Sergo Grigorian provides a collection of over 1200
posters dating from February of 1917 to December of 1991 on a variety of subjects.10 The
main source for the examination of Chinese Propaganda posters is the online database of
chief scholar on the subject and private collector, Stefan Landsberger. Comprising one of
the largest private collections, his collection is on loan to the International Institute of
Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam, which currently houses over 4,500 Chinese posters
and has made progress towards cataloging the entire collection with a web-database and
virtual exhibitions.11 Contemporary art of Russia, China and Cambodia examinations
center around artists generally regarded as the primary figure for that culture, style or
period. For Russian Sots Art, the works of stylistic founders Komar & Melamid are
central as is Alexander Kosolapov whose enormous success exemplifies the Russian
example of post-communist consumer art. For Chinese Pop art, the works of Political
Pop founder, Wang Guangyi and the exemplary Cynical Realist, Yue Minjun, are
examined.
For the research on Cambodian art, both during and after the Khmer Rouge
regime, the painter Vann Nath remains a predominant figure. Vann Nath served as an
invaluable resource in contemporary Cambodian culture, both as an artist and testifier to
the atrocities of Democratic Kampuchea. His autobiography, A Cambodian Prison
Portrait: One Year in Khmer Rouge's S-21, serves as a rich primary source in
10

Sergo Grigorian collection is available for online viewing at
<www.redavantgarde.com/collection/>
11

Stefan Landsberger, a Dutch sinologist at Leiden University, has published a wealth of
scholarship on Chinese propaganda posters, most of which are used within this paper. Landsberger is
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understanding Cambodian art production both during and after the Khmer Rouge regime.
As one of seven survivors of the Khmer Rouge's infamous Tuol Sleng S-21 prison, the
execution site for some 14,000 Cambodians, Vann Nath survived because of his talents as
a painter. He also served as a key witness in the Cambodia Tribunal Case 001 of former
Tuol Sleng warden, Kaing Guek Eav “Duch.”12 Vann Nath provided some of the few
visual representations of life during the Khmer Rouge regime and particularly significant
is his permanent display at the former S-21 Prison, now the Tuol Sleng Genocide
Museum (fig. 3).13 Sadly, Vann Nath died in Phnom Penh in September 2011 at 65 from
kidney disease due to inadequate medical treatment.14 In recognition of his extraordinary
life, his artistic gift and his enormous burden, this paper seeks to honor his memory and
struggle.
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Figure 4. Vann Nath before his Tuol Sleng Prison series. Early 2000s. Phnom
Penh.

The Pond of Tradition: Authority & Religion
“When you are in a latrine, you get used to the smell whether you want to or not.” 1

Although Marxist regimes of the twentieth century arose only after the demise of
imperialism, the success of communist movements such as the Bolsheviks, Maoists and
the Khmer Rouge depended on the the right recipe of traditional notions of authority
imbued with a new socialist ideology. Gaining legitimacy is a key ingredient for a
radically new regime to maintain power and one effective tool is to use existing religious
1

Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837) quoted by Boris Groys, The Total Art of Stalin: Avante-Garde,
Aesthetic Dictatorship and Beyond (Princeton: Princeton, 1992), 3.
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and historical rituals and iconography. Although communist ideology demands the
banning of religious institutions, new leaders adapted these factors to serve Marxism as a
higher power.
At the onset of the twentieth century, Russian and Chinese culture contained
similarities in terms of social stratification, regard for authority, and the importance of
ritual. Life for the peasantry was brutal under both the Russian monarchy and Imperial
China, and both societies were widely agrarian with a predominantly peasant population.
The feudalistic structuring of society discouraged upward mobility and as a result,
literacy rates were low. About half of Russia's rural population and almost one-fifth of
urban citizens were only able to understand even the most simple texts even by 1926.2 In
China, about 57% of the population was still illiterate by 1964.3
By the early twentieth century, Cambodian society was also largely agrarian and
illiterate, but its historic heritage differed from the multiethnic, large-scale empires that
characterized Russia and China. The Khmer were a powerful force in medieval Southeast
Asia, first achieving regional dominance with the Funan empire in the third through sixth
century. The Angkor kingdom, which lasted from the ninth century until its decline in the
seventeenth century, is regarded as the Golden Era of Khmer culture. The culture's
geographic location made it vulnerable to aggressive foreign powers, and Angkor's
demise resulted from endless wars against the western Siam empire and the eastern
2
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Annamese. Contact between China and Cambodia significantly increased by the fifteenth
century from foreign trade routes, and most English or French accounts claim Phnom
Penh a predominantly Chinese city by the late nineteenth century. Cambodia became a
French protectorate in 1864 which served to further stunt any development of a modern,
independent Khmer culture.4
By early twentieth century, Cambodia existed as a quiet corner of French
colonialism. Landlocked since nineteenth century Vietnamese and Thai conquests, the
French educational system further stifled modernization by promoting traditionalism to
support their colonial claims and stalling the development of a Khmer vernacular culture.
A Khmer-language newspaper began only in 1936. Even after France relinquished
Cambodia to King Norodom Sihanouk in 1954,5 Sihanouk's regime continued to suppress
Khmer-language publications exploring topics such as history, politics or economics.6
Nevertheless, his reforms and expansion enabled Cambodia's “overwhelmingly agrarian
society” to produce roughly one million literate and educated Khmer youth or twenty
percent of the total population by 1967.7
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In Russia and China, strong artistic heritages and largely illiterate populations
made the combination of visual motifs and ritual acts an important tool of political
control. The use of an image to symbolize both divinity and authority created a
“traditional visual culture” in which seeing was connected to believing.8 A prevalence of
religious visual objects, such as icons and altars, were typical of both Russian and
Chinese religious culture. Russian Orthodoxy utilized the Byzantine tradition of religious
icons to inform the masses on theology, divinity and authority; even the image itself was
believed to emit powers. Religious devotion and ritual were central in the peasantry's
domestic life as nearly every Russian home and many public buildings contained an icon
corner.9 In Russia, these practices originated in pre-Christian times as ancestor worship.
The pagan altar and its diagonal placement from the stove was transformed into the
Christian icon corner, a staple in nearly every peasant home and center for domestic
religious ritual.
In Imperial Chinese culture, “ritual permeated all aspects of life,”10 and similar to
the Russian icon corner, Chinese homes also contained locations reserved for deities and
ancestor remembrance. An image of a deity known as the Kitchen or Stove God (Zao
wang, Zao jun) with a folklore tradition dating back to the first century CE was placed
across from the stove in Chinese homes and believed to monitor and take note of the
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household’s morality (fig. 5, 6). 11 The separate family altar, designed to honor the
family's ancestors and represent the household as an integrated family unit, housed
ancestral tablets, incense pots and usually a figure of Buddha.12 Chinese spiritualism
consisted of a complex religious and social conglomerate of Confucianism, Daoism and
Buddhism. The state enacted significant influence and control over religion in Imperial
China; the pantheon of deities was divided bureaucratically between the sects of
Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism and was regulated by the Ministry of Rites.13
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(left) Figure 5. Stove God and Wife. Shangdong province poster, early 20th century. 27 x
34 cm.
(right) Figure 6. Stove God and Wife. Shaanxi province poster, early 20th century. 19 x 22
cm.

In Russia, the practices of religion and state were also interconnected; ritual was
of central importance as it constituted social structure and maintained power relations.
The entrenchment and prevalence of these rituals and their visual elements became a
useful tool for control when adapted to serve communism. Russian Orthodoxy's
inheritance of the Byzantine concept of caesaropapism united authority and religion
under the the belief that a monarch exercises both political and spiritual power.14 With
Ivan the Terrible’s adoption of the title tsar in 1547, adoration of saints spilled over into a
veneration for the Russian tsars themselves. Although Peter the Great attempted to sweep
14
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away all aspects of what he deemed archaic religious customs, a general sentiment
remained that the tsar was a batiushka, or little father, to the populous, both caring and
connected to God. Peter's reforms also bound together the powers of church and state by
removing the Russian Orthodox Church's independence, thereby appropriating it as an
apparatus of the state.15
While Russia and China bear similarities in the connections between authority
and spirituality, Chinese and Cambodian culture contain similar customs regarding
religion and social behavior. China and Cambodia practice similar rituals of Buddhism,
but the Chinese conglomerate of Daoism, Confucianism and Buddhism is quite different
from Cambodia's Theravada Buddhism, which was absorbed from Indian influence. The
real similarity between Chinese and Cambodian culture lies in a similar social code of
conduct, derived from earlier religious influence. These behavioral codes were endorsed
by political regimes, as their teachings encourage submission and acceptance of
hierarchical powers. In China, the teachings of Confucius (372-298? BCE) morphed into
an imperial cult and was made the official state ideology during the early Han dynasty
(206 BCE – 220 CE). Emulation of behavioral models became a feature of Confucian
thought as a “concrete embodiment of abstract moral principles.”12 The chbap code of
medieval Angkor spread in temples or at homes during the fourteenth to eighteenth
century as it was memorized and chanted to provide a social code. The oral exercise was
meant to develop a teacher-pupil mentality and submission to hierarchical powers.
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Instructions included family obligations, the need to “act accordingly” towards religion,
and encouragement to remain good subjects or citizens.13
In the twentieth century, the communist regimes in Russia and China utilized
older visual traditions associated with the bond between authority and divinity. While
both regimes were careful not to directly reflect imagery of the former imperial empires,
by borrowing subtle aspects of former rituals, the newly installed communist regimes
were able to bolster their legitimacy by transforming visuals traditionally associated with
authority. For example, the color red became the official palate to symbolize
communism, a choice with deeper connotations in both Russian and Chinese culture. In
Russia, color symbolism was central to Orthodox iconography and red was the traditional
color to denote holiness, divinity and veneration. In the early nineteenth century Russian
icon depicting Elijah's ascent into heaven, Elijah's figure and holiness are indicated to the
viewer by the circle of red surrounding him (fig. 7). The icon, St. Paraskeva Pyatnitsa,
dating from the early seventeenth century identifies the saint's divinity through the
figure's red clothing (fig. 8). Although red was also the color used by the Jacobins in the
French Revolution, Soviet artists were more concerned with stirring recognition among
the peasantry.
In China, as in Russia, the color red emitted older notions of authority and
divinity through its traditional symbolism as luck and power. Traditional Chinese
symbolism connected the sun with the color red; the rising Eastern sun represents power,
probably as a result of the ancient practice of solar worship among the peasantry.
13
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Imagery of the sun also became a symbol for the emperor.14 Although the official
embrace of the color red was, in part, an inherited attribute of communism from the
Soviet Union, it also served Chinese artists as it had Russian artists with the unique
ability to impart notions of authority and divinity through a cultural recognition of color
symbolism.

Figure 7. The Fiery Ascent of the Prophet Elijah. Russian icon, circa early 19th century.
Egg tempera, gold and gesso on wood. 30.5 x 24.7 cm.
14
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Figure 8. St. Paraskeva Pyatnitsa. Russian icon, circa early 17th century. Egg
tempera on wood. 45.2 x 36.6 cm.

Employing these earlier heritages of imperial cults and authoritarian rule allowed
Stalin and Mao to build their modern communist personality cults on the existing
foundations. By contrast, in the absence of either a recent longstanding dynasty or an
imperial cult, religion alone served as the most influential tradition in the rise of Pol Pot.
Buddhism and its teaching style was a familiar and respected system within Khmer
society. Prior to the twentieth century, education for Khmer males occurred at the
24

Buddhist monasteries (wat) where the boys would remain for periods of three months to
several years. Pol Pot's initial education occurred at a wat outside Phnom Penh.15 For
Cambodia, power and religion became connected through the twentieth century
development of Cambodian Buddhism. Ironically, forces of religion aligned with a
nationalist desire for independence, which proved to be particularly fervent and
influential among Cambodian Buddhist monks.16
The Cambodian wat carried considerable influence as the previous sole source of
education and Buddhist monks were highly respected within Khmer society. By the
1950s, over 2,500 wats were reported in Cambodia, most belonging to the populist
Mohanikay Order of Theravada Buddhism. Growing popularity in the 1920s of a
Vietnamese sect, Cao Dai or Caodaism, concerned the French, since a union of the
historically bitter rivals Vietnam and Cambodia could challenge French colonial power in
the region. French efforts to reshape Cambodian Buddhism away from all foreign
influence bolstered revolutionary sentiments among Buddhist monks, and the earliest
Khmer independence and nationalist movements were fostered by Buddhist monks.17
Most notably, the former Buddhist monk Son Ngoc Minh, along with
predominantly Buddhist monk delegates, established the first nationalist, independence
movement, the Unified Issarak Front or UIF (Samakhum Khmer Issarak) in 1950. By
1951, Vietnamese sponsored the group's transformation into the Khmer People's
Revolutionary Party (KPRP), largely comprised of rural citizens with strong Buddhist
backgrounds. Pol Pot's assumption of control over this faction in 1962 increased his
15
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power. His 1967 reformation named the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK)
provoked a military reaction that only served to further drain and destabilize Sihanouk's
regime, enabling its overthrow three years later.18
Pol Pot did not possess the qualities of a natural leader nor did he have a striking
presence. Instead, his popularity, influence and power stemmed from an ability to
harness religious and cultural traditions. His teaching style and method derived from
techniques used by Buddhist wats. His public speaking tone was smooth and familiar,
often described as hypnotic. His behavior towards those surrounding him remained kind
and gracious, reminiscent of chbap codes of behavior. Pol Pot's claims of a peasant's
religious upbringing are both true and embellished. Born Solath Sar in 1928 to a pious
family, he received his earliest education at a Buddhist monastery.19
Although later he became an affirmed atheist, Pol Pot's manner, leadership and
speech continued to reflect Buddhist principles and teaching styles. He gained respect
and a following through his unwavering display of ideal conduct, regarded by all as
controlled, elegant and kindhearted. Prince Sihanouk repeatedly described Pol Pot as “a
perfect host” and “charismatic [man]” who delighted the Prince by taking the submissive
posture appropriate when addressing a royal.20 In late 1978, Pol Pot gave interviews to
several groups of foreign visitors who also described his manner as polished, controlled
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and calm.21 This behavior is reminiscent of the tranquility exhibited by Buddhist monks
as well as a cultural embrace of the chbap behavioral code.
During the 1960s, the Khmer Rouge successfully recruited many new supporters
and Pol Pot's speeches from this time followed in the style of Buddhist sermons, making
the communist principles more familiar and appealing to monks, students and teachers
alike. A monk who attended Pol Pot's seminars in 1962 described his speeches as
“harmonious and persuasive; he used examples skillfully.” 22 Others recalled his calm
voice when he delivered speeches in an “everyday” manner as mesmerizing, “like a
father speaking to his children.”23 He was known to target individualism in his speeches,
and his commitment to this idea seems to be sincere considering his unspoken adherence
to Buddhist behavioral traditions. Furthermore, his rejection of a personality cult also
points to a Buddhist-inspired anti-individualism, for despite visits to China at the height
of Mao's cult and the considerable Chinese influence within Democratic Kampuchea, Pol
Pot ultimately rejected any promotion of a cult, instead gaining influence by emulating
Buddhist traditions.
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A River Runs Through It: Art & Communism

“Learn from the masses, and then teach them.”1

For the radically new communist governments of the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China, art aided the political and societal transition. Art worked as a
fluid force which nurtured new ideologies through the very tributaries which previously
aided the former archaic regimes. The visual nature of art served as an efficient way to
inform the Russian and Chinese people as to ideology, policies and leaders. Propaganda
art was most influential through the political poster medium, as poster production and
display was an efficient and affordable means to visually inform and influence society
despite initial disruption and destruction of societal infrastructures. The use of political
posters in the USSR was significant; the state publication house, Gosizdat, reported
printing 7.5 million posters from seventy-five designs in 1920 alone.2
Under the Chinese communist party, poster art (xuanchuanhua) also flourished,
aided by the fact that China has the oldest printmaking tradition in the world with original
woodblock printing techniques first developed during Tang Dynasty (618-907 CE).3 In
China, radical programs such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution
were greatly aided by the informative nature of political poster art. Citizens “carefully
studied political posters for guidance, trying to detect any subtle change in form or
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ideology, redirection…They were accustomed to… verbal codes and symbols in the
media…”4 While complete societal re-education was difficult if not impossible,
propaganda posters educated the masses on communist ideology and party policy through
imagery understood by even the illiterate members of society.
In both the USSR and the PRC, political posters were widely available, cheap to
procure and visible everywhere, from railroad stations, to streets, to magazines, to almost
every imaginable public space.5 In the case of Cambodia, the initial societal disruption
morphed into a total dismantling and near destruction of all artistic production, therefore
very little artwork production or survival remains from Democratic Kampuchea. Khmer
Rouge political posters, although low in numbers, were often displayed on roadsides and
in communal dining halls. They provided the only official visual form of information, as
most of the Khmer Rouge ideology was relayed orally to the population.6
In order to reflect the divergence from antiquated systems that communism sought
to embrace, new artistic adaptations were necessary to visually indicate the political and
ideological change. The rise of communism in the Soviet Union sparked the development
of a new stylistic genre known as Socialist Realism, in which state sponsored art
promoted approved ideological messages. Socialist Realism served as a stylistic
foundation for subsequent communist regimes in other regions. Although the style was
adapted according to individual cultural aesthetics, Socialist Realism remained a staple
of communist art production. Highly contrived, this style holds a unique place among art
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classifications. The public ceases to function as a force or participant in artistic processes
and instead becomes exclusively a viewer of art without the opportunity or ability to act
as a consumer or possessor.7
Socialist Realism drastically altered four key roles that art generally holds. First,
public awareness was transformed into an object open to direct manipulation. Secondly,
state-sponsored artistic and ideological programs denied individualism. Thirdly leaders
became direct mediators of culture with the ability to choose what was positive or
negative and determined what the public should know. Lastly, the role of art criticism
was constricted to reinforcing the policies imposed from above; art critics acted as
priests to their parishioners in the church of socialist realism.8
The stylistic roots of Socialist Realism began with pre-revolutionary Russian
artists who engaged with Western European art movements and were eager to promote
new ideas through art. While many did not officially align themselves with any political
party, they often took a revolutionary stance against elite institutions such as the Imperial
Academy of Arts.9 Artists who initially produced poster art for the Bolsheviks came from
varied backgrounds, and as a result, early Soviet poster art was quite consistent in
iconography with influences from folk art, classical and religious mythology, as well as
earlier forms of political art or Western modernism. Due to their skills and connections,
many of the early propaganda artists had been trained as religious icon painters or even
worked as political artists for the previous tsarist regime. Although careful not to directly
emulate tsarist iconography, early Soviet artists utilized aspects of Russian Orthodox
7
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iconography in order to more effectively capture the attention and understanding of the
population.
Soviet propaganda artists capitalized on the well-known color symbolism of
Orthodox iconography and utilized standard iconographic compositions, such as a central
figure surrounded by scenes of past and present. As was common practice, the faces of
important figures are portrayed in full or three quarter view and often appear
disproportionately large in relation to their surroundings (fig. 9-12).10 The audience for
Soviet poster art was as varied as the artists. They ranged from peasants who never
ventured far from their villages to educated intellectuals who had traveled throughout
Europe. The one consistency uniting these factions of viewers was their great exposure to
a visual culture that had once been dominated by religious imagery from the Russian
Orthodox Church.11
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(left) Figure 9. Nicholas the Wonder-Worker. Russian icon, circa 1800-1850. Egg
tempera and gesso on wood. 37.7 x 31.2 cm.
(right) Figure 10. Yastrzhembsky. Glory to the creator of USSR constitution, the great
Stalin! Soviet propaganda poster, 1937. 104 x 72 cm.

(left) Figure 11. St. Nicholas the Wonder-Worker. Russian icon, circa early 18th century.
Egg tempura and gesso on wood. 22.7 x 17.8 cm.
(right) Figure 12. Mukhin. Long live the leader of the Soviet people – great Stalin! 1947.
Soviet propaganda poster with photo montage. 108 x 69.5 cm.
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The Soviet endorsement of Realism and rejection of Avant-gardism can be linked
to pillars of thought and aesthetics of their revolutionary leader. Lenin believed in his
idea of partiinost which demanded all must submit to decisions made by the party.12
Although Lenin’s primary focus for Bolshevik policy from 1918-1921 was War
Communism, he did institute policies which would influence the future of art in Russia
and subsequent communist nations who looked to the Soviet Union as a model to
emulate. The major art academies of Moscow and Petrograd were initially closed
following the Bolshevik coup, but they were renamed as “State Artistic and Technical
Studios” and opened to the public in 1918. That same year Lenin published his Plan for
Monumental Propaganda which served to begin the communist destruction of much
cultural heritage from tsarist times. On Lenin’s behalf, letters from the Central
Committee were published throughout 1920-21 attacking the activities of Avant-garde
artists, making the party's official embrace of Realism inevitable.
Individualism was to be eradicated, thereby requiring artists to produce works for
the communal good, as deemed by the party, rather than individual artistic expression.
Lenin had rather conventional taste in art, reportedly displaying little appreciation for
Avant-garde movements. In Lenin’s mind, art was meant to be beautiful since it belonged
to the people and should be loved and understood by the masses.13 This conservative
approach to art helped preserve older artistic traditions, especially in realist genres such as
portraiture or religious imagery that had thrived under pre-revolutionary institutes such as
the Moscow College of Painting or the Imperial Academy of Art.
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In China, as early as the first United Front with the Nationalist Party
(Guomindang or GMD) from 1924-1927, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made
attempts to eradicate “old culture” and teach the population about communist ideology.
Through Mao's Jiangxi Soviet (1931-1934), the CCP incorporated art and propaganda to
educate their followers and inspire loyalty. The Party chose to emulate The New Year
Print (nianhua), an extremely popular nineteenth century style of poster art depicting folk
art imagery and religious deities that was used to decorate homes during the holidays (fig.
13). The popularity of the New Year Print made it an effective visual object to integrate
traditional symbolism with communist ideology. The acceptance and success of the
modified New Year Print provided a basis from which propaganda art could begin
replacing antiquated visual rituals while simultaneously teaching society about
communism.14

14

Lincoln Cushing, Chinese Posters: Art from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (San
Francisco: Chronicle, 2007), 10-11. Landsberger, “The Deification of Mao” 142-3.

34

Figure 13. Fortune, Official Salary, Longevity. Shangdong province nianhua
poster, early 20th century. 35 x 52 cm.

Mao, who was more inspired by Lenin's successes than by strict Marxist doctrine,
tended to follow Leninist attitudes and policies towards art. At his 1942 “Yan’an Talks
on Art and Literature,” Mao proclaimed that art should serve the needs of politics:
rejecting imperialist and bourgeois influences while reflecting socialist principles. Mao
stated multiple times that borrowing from “the rich legacy and the good traditions in
literature and art that have been handed down from past ages in China and foreign
35

countries” was acceptable, as long as it was, “remolded and infused with new content…
something revolutionary in the service of the people.”15 This solved the problematic issue
of borrowing European ideologies from Marxism-Leninism as well as the adaptation of
Russian Socialist Realism to incorporate Chinese artistic traditions and aesthetics.16 As
the party began to recognize art as an important tool for cultural change, it recruited many
artists to begin producing propaganda works. At the Lu Xun Academy of Literature and
Art in Yan'an, the party offered courses in art history, drawing and propaganda painting.17
By 1943, Chinese propaganda art began producing leader images of Mao, Lenin and
Marx. Such portraiture had no roots in traditional Chinese art; it came to China by way of
the Soviet Union, which did carry portraiture as a Western artistic heritage and staple of
Orthodox iconography.
Socialist Realism was the official artistic style of the People’s Republic of China
from 1949-1957. During this time, many Chinese artists traveled to the Soviet Union to
study in their art academies or under Soviet professors working in China. With the Great
Leap Forward program of the late 1950s, however, Socialist Realism in the Soviet style
was abandoned in favor of an artistic style deemed more reflective of Mao's upbeat
optimism characteristic of the “greater, faster, better, cheaper” campaign. Deciding that
Soviet Socialist Realism was somewhat gloomy, Mao called for a “fusion of
revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism,” which was intended to relay
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feelings of enthusiasm, hope and optimism to the population to aid in overcoming
societal obstacles.18
The initiation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966 shook the art
world with the suspension of all academic art courses and art publications, such as
magazines or periodicals. The Cultural Revolution vilified individual artistic expression
as bourgeois and counterrevolutionary, and well-known artists and art professors were
persecuted. The goal was to protect and maintain a pure communist ideology by
removing any discussion or display of ancient or Western ideas and art. While the
“Destroy the Four Olds” policy focused on the eradication of old ideas, culture, customs
and habits, it actually preserved customs and symbols associated with deity worship or
authority. These were simply re-created with Mao's image. Mao thus became a primary
subject of art production in the country's now completely politicized art.19 Images of Mao
dominated poster art, often at the expense of exclusion of other subjects20 and Chinese
statistics indicate that about 2.2 billion portraits of Mao were produced by 1979.21
In Cambodia, artistic heritage and production differed drastically from practices
found in China and Russia. The medieval Angkor empire produced impressive works in
architecture and sculpture, but centuries of societal disruption from foreign conflict and
conquest caused very little Khmer art production after the fall of Angkor. Painting or
portraiture was almost non existent in Khmer arts and by the early twentieth century,
18
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Chinese, Japanese and French influence was reflected by Cambodian artists in a hybrid of
these influencing styles.22 When the French began establishing their Ecole des Arts
Cambodgiens in 1918, the program director reported that only about 130 artisans were
known to exist in the country including twenty of whom worked for the royal family. 23
The French director lamented that there was virtually no remnant of true Cambodian art
as Europeans trained the royal painters and even the royal palace had been constructed
entirely by Europeans.24
The French set about trying to determine and teach traditionally pure Khmer art
which they deemed to be, “literary, cerebral and religious.”25 Despite these French efforts,
the Khmer Rouge destroyed almost all cultural or artistic development through policies
which caused extreme societal disruption. By relocating Phnom Penh's citizens to the
countryside, most of the artisans and intellectuals who were capable of producing
propaganda art died from unhealthy conditions typical of the agrarian re-education.
Others were executed during the waves of purges, which increasingly targeted
intellectuals, trained professionals and former government employees.
Three Cambodian artists are known to have worked for the Khmer Rouge regime:
Sam Kem Chang, Pech Song and Vann Nath. Sam Kem Chang survived the brutality due
to his connections with important members of the Khmer Rouge and worked under the
Ministry of Culture producing descriptive drawings and cartoons for the national
newspaper and official pamphlets. Pech Song was able to prove his artistic skills by
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drawing victorious scenes of the Khmer Rouge on the walls where he was imprisoned. He
was eventually released and commissioned to produce political cartoons, banners and
propaganda for official Democratic Kampuchea projects. Unfortunately none of the work
produced by either Sam or Pech during this period survived.26 Vann Nath, the third artist,
was imprisoned within the infamous Tuol Sleng S-21 Prison where he was recruited to
produce images of Pol Pot. He survived only because of his artistic skill.
Ironically, within the dreaded walls of the Tuol Sleng S-21 Prison, a workshop for
a small group of artisans was established by the Khmer Rouge. The facility originated as
a school and a handful prisoners known to have artisan skills were moved to a studio
section of the complex equipped with the necessary supplies. At the regime topple in
1979, the Vietnamese discovered the prison complex along with several oil portraits of
Pol Pot at S-21, seemingly copied after photographs. Concrete molds for statues of the
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deposed leader were also found including at least one which had been cast in silver.27
Vann Nath provides an explanation for this artwork in his memoir's recollections of life
at the S-21 Prison. Together with a stone sculptor, two other painters and ten carpenters,
Vann was taken from a fate of torture and imminent death to live separately in a
workspace. Some of these artisans, given ample amounts of food, were able to survive for
years inside the prison walls. But selection was not a guarantee of survival as Vann was
warned that two other painters before him had failed to win approval and were removed
from the workshop to be sentenced to death.28
Vann calculates that over five months, he painted eight portraits of Pol Pot and
assisted in the molding of numerous statues of Pol Pot.29 While adjusting the molds to
exact specification, for silver casting, Vann describes them as being “for a statue of
Brother Number One: Pol Pot.”30 The officials at the prison deemed these works a
success and commissioned larger works, including an eight meter tall statue of Pol Pot
surrounded by farmers and flags to illustrate the history of class struggle. The artists were
informed the statue would replace the Buddhist stupa and pagodas set to be destroyed on
top of Wat Phnom. Although Pol Pot never visited the artisans at S-21, Vann recalls
hearing that a smaller model of the statue was sent for his approval, but the regime's
topple in 1979 disrupted any further plans and projects.31 The reason for these
commissions is somewhat unclear, as other artists who did produce official artwork for
27
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the Khmer Rouge were never required to produce leader portraits or images of Pol Pot.
Some scholars hypothesize that prison officials orchestrated the commissions as a
desperate ploy to gain favor and security against political purges.32
Communist art production in the USSR and PRC initiated some new adaptations,
such as the development of Socialist Realism, but the art also served to enforce older
notions and connections between authority and spirituality. The immense flood of art
production allowed and nourished the development of communist cults of personality as
well, exemplified through the artistic glorification of Stalin and Mao. While Pol Pot's
regime did not bolster a leader cult or Cambodian arts, the workshop at the S-21 Prison
yielded an oasis from which contemporary Cambodian art would later flow. Vann Nath
aided the atonement of the Khmer Rouge injustice, because as a survivor of S-21, he was
able to provide an artistic record of the historical events which occurred at the prison.
Continuing to work as a a painter until his death, Vann also served as a fountainhead for
contemporary Cambodian art.
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Figure 14. S-21 Prison workshop. Pol Pot busts, circa late 1970s. Displayed at Tuol
Sleng Genocide Museum, formerly the S-21 Prison. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Death Becomes Him: Cults & the Grave
“There will be no more death … for the old order of things has passed away.” 1

One of the most remarkable features of the communist cult of personality
continues to be the mystic proportions to which adoring masses endorsed the leader. By
invoking powerful devotional sentiments of authority and divinity, a leader's personality
cult ensured popularity while legitimizing power and maximizing control. Lenin was
involuntarily promoted as a cult figure only after his death, an action seen as necessity
by Stalin and the young Bolshevik regime. Lenin was culturally deified through the
symbolic power of his burial, the subsequent production of his image and its promotion
in icon corners all over Russia. Stalin capitalized on Lenin's popularity by molding his
cult image to reflect his position as heir to Marxism-Leninism (fig. 15, 16).
1
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(left) Figure 15. Gustav Klutsis. Under Lenin's Banner for Socialist Construction, 1930.
Soviet propaganda poster with photo montage.
(right) Figure 16. Golub. Under Lenin's banner, under Stalin's guidance, forward to new
victories! 1945. Soviet propaganda poster. 85 x 59 cm.

Just as Stalin cultivated a cult reminiscent of the Russian tsars, Mao also
modeled himself after former emperors. Mao did not shy away from making
comparisons with himself and the Chinese monarchs, and his portrayal in propaganda art
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evokes the mystical power of the early Imperial cults. The intensity of Mao's cult
supersedes those of Stalin or Lenin because Mao combined both the revolutionary
founding spirit of Lenin along with the all encompassing power of Stalin. Despite the
heavy Soviet influence in both the style and subject of a communist leader, Chinese art
utilized traditional iconography and symbolism to promote religious-like authority, just
as the Soviets utilized aspects of its religious icons.
The ancient Chinese symbol of power and divinity, the red sun, became a popular
association with Chairman Mao. A frequent and visually striking representations of a
deified Mao shows him centered pictorially within a sun, sometimes reworked with his
disembodied head serving as the source of radiating solar rays (fig. 17-19). This imagery
coincides with popular sayings of the time, such as “Mao is the sun in our hearts” or
“Mao the reddest sun” but relay deeper notions of authority and devotion for the
Chinese.2 Bolstered by the traditional notions of an authoritarian leader and religious
model, Mao emerged as the national symbol of China's quest to modernize.
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Figure 17. Unknown. Respectfully wish Chairman Mao eternal life, 1968. Chinese
poster. 52 x 71 cm.

Figure 18. Central Academy of Industrial Arts collective work. Advance victoriously
while following Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in literature and the
arts, circa 1968. Chinese propaganda poster. 76.5 x 154 cm.
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Figure 19. Unknown. The working class must exercise leadership in everything,
1970. Chinese poster.

Another frequently used motif was that of Mao as exemplary model for all roles
and situations.3 Depictions portrayed him in a plethora of roles. He would be shown as
the Great Teacher, the Wise Statesman or the Astute Military Leader (fig. 20).
Representations of him as a Benevolent Father recalled Confucian notions of obedience
and subjugation to authority, ideas which were deeply ingrained in Chinese culture (fig.
21). No matter what the specific personification, some scholars hypothesize that by
portraying Mao as a master of all societal roles, his image came to denote divine
connotations. As a result, artists increasingly chose to depict Mao in detached, god-like
3
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forms.4 Other scholars have hypothesized that the image of Mao came to evoke “feelings
of religious adoration” through the political power of the man in combination with the
ubiquity of the image.5

Figure 20. Shanghai renmin meishu chubanshe collective word. Forging ahead
courageously while following the great leader Chairman Mao! 1969.
Chinese propaganda poster. 72 x 106.5 cm.

4

Landsberger, “Mao Cult,” from “Stefan Landsberger's Chinese Propaganda Posters,”
International Institute of Social History.
5

Dal Lago, “Personal Mao,” 49.

47

Figure 21. Sun Guocheng. Reporting to Chairman Mao, 1974. Chinese propaganda
poster. 53 x 77 cm.

Despite the considerable influence of Maoist ideas in Cambodia, Democratic
Kampuchea's communist leader, Pol Pot, orchestrated what could be called an anti-cult.
Pol Pot's anti-cult was completely opposite those of his communist forefathers'
traditions. His identity as a leader was not promoted for influence or devotion, but
rather, he preferred to keep his role relatively obscure and ambiguous. Very few public
appearances of Pol Pot while in power were documented. No official biography was ever
published in the party's Tung Padevat or broadcast on Radio Phnom Penh. No
photographs of Pol Pot were published in Party literature and the Party never used his
anecdotes or “thoughts” to promote the regime or its leader. He allowed limited exposure
48

from 1978-1979, through meetings and interviews with select foreign diplomats,
journalists and guests. This self-advertisement came about only in hopes of stabilizing
his regime in the face of Vietnamese invasions. After the toppling of his regime by the
Vietnamese in 1979, Pol Pot was able to escape into the jungles of northwestern
Cambodia. The anonymity and ambiguity consistent of Pol Pot's anti-cult ultimately
served him well as it allowed his survival even after the international condemnation of
his regime.
Pol Pot died of natural causes at 73 in 1998 in Anlong Veng along the Dangrek
Mountain region of northern Cambodia where he lived since his regime collapse in 1979.
Pol Pot's body was prepared and displayed in his simple thatched hut for foreign
journalists to view.6 Pol Pot's body was cremated according to Buddhist traditions; his
corpse “contained in a rough wooden coffin” was placed on a pyre made of wood and
rubber tires. Some of his belongings were burned with him, including a mattress, chair
and walking stick. Only about twenty mourners reportedly attended the event, including
Pol Pot's wife and teenage daughter. Today, the funeral pyre is marked by signs and has
been made into a cultural heritage site protected by Cambodia's Ministry of Tourism.7
While the activities surrounding Pol Pot's death are atypical for one of modern history's
most condemned dictators, they also cement the anti-cult legacy that is typical of Pol
Pot's political career.
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Figure 22. Pol Pot on his deathbed, mid April, 1998. Anlong Veng, northern
Cambodia.

Figure 23. Pol Pot funeral pyre, mid April 1998. Anlong Veng, northern
Cambodia.
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Figure 24. Pol Pot funeral pyre. Protected by the Cambodian Ministry of Tourism.
Northern Cambodia.

The means and trappings of death contribute to a fallen leader's reputation and
legacy. The symbolic power of a leader's death became an important feature of the
communist cult of personality. In fact, the genesis of communist personality cults
actually originates with death, the death of Marxism's prophet, Lenin on January 21,
1924. Although Lenin adamantly discouraged any promotion of a personality cult while
alive, the transformational power of death flickered in even his first brushes with
mortality. A failed assassination attempt in 1918 coincided with production of his first
official image.8 As Lenin’s health declined in the early 1920s and he was increasingly
8
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unable to make public appearances, the production and appearance of his image in
propaganda art was increased. In 1924, the personality cult of Lenin arose out of the
leader's death and the Bolshevik Party arrangements for his funeral and burial.9 Against
the direct wishes of Lenin and his family, the Party had the body embalmed and
entombed in a special mausoleum built in Red Square.10
Even before the mausoleum was completed, Lenin's body was displayed in a
temporary structure starting on August 1, 1924. The public display of Lenin's body is
culturally steeped in authoritarian leadership and religious divinity. For centuries,
important figures such as the tsar or religious leaders were publicly displayed with
elaborate burial rituals conducted by the Russian Orthodox church. Church dogma
insisted on the incorruptibility of saints' bodies. So steadfast was this belief that Russians
were often shocked at the decay of supposedly holy figures, as occurred during the
canonization of St. Seraphim of Sarov in 1903. Dostoyevsky exemplifies the belief when
Alyosha Karamazov is horrified at the smell of Father Zosima’s dead body, whom he
considered to be pure as a saint.11 The embalmed body of Lenin, eternally pure in its lack
of decomposition, finalized Lenin’s role as the Soviet’s divine ruler and savior. The very
design of Lenin’s mausoleum, which consisted of polished marble and granite, and most
significantly contained the mummified body of Lenin under a glass pyramid, evoked
grandeur and notions of Egyptian pharaohs. The design and placement of the mausoleum
is visually harmonious and connected to the Kremlin. Stalin oversaw and approved of
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this design, as it indicated the supreme authority, divinity and immortality of Lenin, a
position which Stalin deemed himself to be heir. 12

Figure 25. Embalmed corpse of V. I. Lenin, early 1924. Moscow.
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Figure 26. Mausoleum interior and corpse of Lenin. Moscow.

Figure 27. Lenin's mausoleum. Red Square, Moscow.

54

At Stalin's death in March of 1953, his body was also embalmed and placed
alongside Lenin's in the mausoleum. Mao also followed the Lenin-Stalin communist
precedent of embalming and public display in a mausoleum. Death rituals, although
extremely important in the Chinese cultural identity, were not directly associated with
leadership per se. The funerals of emperors were never political or even public events.
Deceased emperors, although deified according to imperial dogma, were not deified by
the population. They were exclusively worshiped by acting emperors. Embalming was
also contrary to Chinese customs and Marxist ideology. The death rituals for Mao
resulted from politics of legitimation.13 Mao's funeral was enacted at Tiananmen Square,
surrounding the Heavenly Gate where Mao had declared the People's Republic on
October 1, 1949, and Mao's portrait was installed beneath the actual location. An
estimated 500,000 attended, honoring the deceased by uniting in silence at the climax of
the funeral ceremony. Mao's mausoleum was unveiled in 1977 at the one year
anniversary of Mao's death, completed in less than six months. Mao's portrait on the
Heavenly Gate faces directly towards the mausoleum housing his entombed remains,
creating a juxtaposition between the mortal and the eternal Mao.14
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Figure 28. Funeral of Mao Zedong, late September 1976. Beijing.

Figure 29. Public display of Mao's corpse. Mao's Memorial Hall. Beijing.

56

Figure 30. Mao Zedong's Memorial Hall, Beijing.

After Lenin's premature death in 1924, the Bolsheviks were in a precarious
position of maintaining control despite the demise of their adored founder and leader.
Necessity proved the initial motivation for the development of this first communist cult
of personality, although communist cults of personality continued to develop out of
necessity, practicality or paranoia. Necessity also came for Stalin's cult with the failure of
Collectivization and the resulting famines which killed an estimated 20 million. Stalin’s
popularity plummeted, and while his position was never in serious jeopardy, his welldocumented paranoia certainly led him to pursue avenues in order to cement his claims
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to power. It is therefore no coincidence that during 1932-33, Stalin’s figure began to
eclipse Lenin’s in political art. By using state propaganda to counter negative sentiments
towards his failed policies,15 Stalin carefully cultivated his own claims to power by first
venerating Lenin,16 then gradually incorporating his image to imply equality17 and
eventually eclipsing Lenin’s prominence by the early 1930s.18
Stalin was clear in recognizing the practicality for Russian culture, saying, “the
people need a tsar” and “don’t forget that we are living in Russia, land of tsars…Russian
people like it when one person stands at the head of the state.”19 Under Stalin, Soviet
policy during the late 1920s and early 1930s served to spread especially traditional
values of the peasantry into the urban mainstream of Russia, increasing the practicality of
Soviet cults of personality. The political and social purge of 1929, which replaced urban
elites with common, grassroots citizens served to reinforce more traditional cultural
values. A further increase of lower class citizens in administrative and government
positions from 1928-32 caused for traditional views to become “the national style of the
Soviet Union.” As “the party was transforming society, ‘society’ entered the party.”
Stalin orchestrated these predominant cultural factors to his political advantage,
emerging as the all powerful, all knowing Soviet tsar.20
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The necessity of a personality cult came to Mao as a need to gather popular
support against radical and unsuccessful policies such as “The Great Leap Forward,”
which resulted in approximately thirty million deaths and an overall population decline of
ten million between 1959 and 1960.21 Like Stalin, Mao's personality leaned towards
paranoia, and a cult of personality could counteract actual and imagined political foes.
Excess purging during the Cultural Revolution aimed to eliminate all
counterrevolutionaries, and while compared to the Great Leap Forward, the death toll was
significantly less at around one million, the disruption to society left “deeper scars on
[the] collective consciousness of Chinese culture.”22
Even though the PRC remained Democratic Kampuchea's closest adviser, mentor
and trade partner, the lack of a Maoist inspired cult for Pol Pot, or the anti-cult of Pol
Pot, derives from several different factors.23 In Cambodia, centuries of foreign rule did
not create a heritage for leader adulation. Buddhist principles held higher appeal and
respect among the masses and Pol Pot gained and maintained popularity by emulating
Buddhist teaching traditions and social behavior. As previously outlined, Cambodian
culture did not practice extensive production of art as typical of the pre-communist
regimes in both Russia and China and already low numbers of working artists before the
Khmer Rouge regime only allowed for limited survival against re-education in the
countryside. The Khmer Rouge's ideological quest for an agrarian utopia so drastically
altered Cambodian society that extensive production of art and visual propaganda was
not possible.
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When the Communist Party of Kampuchea took power, there was not a clear
Khmer Rouge leader widely known among the population. Although Pol Pot was a key
figure and of great importance to the regime, Khieu Samphan was also generally
associated as the leader. S-21 Prison painter Vann Nath’s initial experience when
questioned as to the leader of Democratic Kampuchea exemplifies the lack of clarity
within the regime: Presented with a large photograph of Pol Pot he was to paint, Vann
had no idea as to the identity of the person in the image. Deuch questioned him, “Do you
know this person? Try and make a guess … Say who it is,” and when Vann doubtfully
replied, “Well, it’s … Brother … Brother … Khieu Samphan,” Deuch and the guards
burst out in laughter.24
Even as Nath began his first painting of Pol Pot, he wondered as to the identity of
the man in the photograph as while in the countryside, “we thought there was no one
with a higher rank than Khieu Samphan … Why had another man appeared?”25 As he
closely examined the photography in order to produce a correct painted version, he
mused,

“Surely this photograph must be of the supreme leader of this regime …
His face looked smooth and calm, but I knew he must be savage and very
evil … how could he look so pleasant yet treat people so cruelly ….
people of the same Khmer blood without feeling any regret (?)”26

Drastic purges within the regime occurred during this time and the Tuol Sleng
prison was the destination and end for these so called enemies of the state. Although
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Khieu Samphan remained at a high level of power throughout the purges and even
during the regime’s exile, Pol Pot emerged as Democratic Kampuchea's uncontested
leader while still remaining largely unknown among the general population.
Cambodian historian David Chandler speculates that probably the images from
S-21 were not official commissions but rather ideas of the prison officials.27 The accounts
of artist Sam Kem Chang support Chandlers speculations as Sam states that he never saw
a portrait of Pol Pot hanging in any building while working for the Khmer Rouge in
Phnom Penh.28 Pech Song's duties as artist and propagandist for the Khmer Rouge did
not include producing leader portraits, therefore the productions at S-21 seem to have
resulted from motivations other than official party orders. Probably those in charge at S21 recruited artists from among the prisoners and ordered the production of Pol Pot's
image in hopes of gaining favor and security within the regime. The well known brutality
and immense purges of the regime created a constant state of fear and paranoia even
within the Khmer Rouge party. Sam Kem Chang recalls that the staff of his office for the
Ministry of Culture degenerated from committed revolutionaries to paranoid, terrified
individualists who one by one disappeared and never returned.29 Sam also states that the
head of the Ministry planned to gather a group of artists to produce official state
propaganda, so there seemed to be some desire among the Khmer Rouge to emulate the
artistic traditions of other communist states such as China.30

27

Chandler, ibid, 150.

28

Muan, ibid, 388.

29

Muan, 389.

30

Given the foreign education of most senior Khmer Rouge and the significant Chinese influence
throughout the regime, perhaps the S-21 commissions of Pol Pot also derive from a Maoist influence of
leader worship.

61

Other than the necessity and practicality of Pol Pot's anti-cult, what aspects of his
background or personality would contribute to the paranoid aspect of communist leader
cults? Pol Pot is atypical of the leader of one of history's most destructive regimes as he
grew up with seemingly no hardship or strife and was regarded throughout his life as
calm and kindhearted. He was a member of the Cambodian elite yet eventually rejected
even the mention of these connection or his upbringing. Born as Saloth Sar, Pol Pot did
adopt a nom de guerre as consistent with communist leaders, but his revolutionary name
contains no specific meaning, void of inspirational connotations as with “steel” Stalin or
“enlightened one” Ho Chi Minh. Pol Pot is in fact common among the rural Cambodian
population.31
Pol Pot's paranoid motive for an anti-cult comes in his desire to appear an average
agrarian peasant with a strong Buddhist background. In actuality, Saloth Sar's family was
connected to the royal palace through his cousin who was a member of the court's corps
de ballet and a high ranking consort to the king. Saloth Sar, was relocated from his
village home to Phnom Penh around 1934 or 1935 when he was about nine years old. He
spent several months at a Buddhist monastery favored by the royal court where he was
received Buddhist training and became literate in Khmer.32 This royal connection
allowed him the education and elevation consistent of the Cambodian elite and he was
among the first hundred Khmer students sent with government scholarships to study in
France from 1949 to 1953 where he became influenced by communist ideas and
befriended other key radial Khmer students.33
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Although his experiences at the royal court and the opportunities it allowed him
certainly had an enormous effect on his life, Pol Pot reportedly never mentioned his
palace connections, choosing rather to emphasize his family's rural origins. He never
publicly admitted his actual identity once working under the Pol Pot pseudonym. Saloth
Sar's parents were both ethnic Khmer. His father was a prosperous provincial farmer and
his mother well known for her piety and good deeds. There is no known conflict or
hardship in Saloth Sar's early life, in fact his caretakers in Phnom Penh remember him as
“a lovely child” who had “no difficulties with other students, no fights or quarrels.”34 Yet
the ultimate rejection of his elite upbringing and his policies for Democratic Kampuchea
seem to indicate a deep resentment towards the society and class which allowed his rise
to power. When giving speeches about a “new society” he was known to highlight the
royal dancers as an example of the flaws in Cambodian culture, vilifying them with
claims of “living off the people,”35 and when the Khmer Rouge took power, the corps de
ballet was immediately disbanded.36
Communist personality cults developed mostly out of cultural practicality and
political necessity but which figures or forces are directly responsible for implementing
personality cults? Following Lenin's death, Stalin's considerable influence as General
Secretary aided in the Party's decisions and policies to deify their deceased Marxist
leader, Lenin. The development of Lenin's cult was also a natural reaction from a public
looking for an outlet in which to express their grief and affection for Lenin. The public
found this outlet in “the only terminology they knew” thus reverting back to the age-old
34
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Russian traditions used in the veneration of saints and tsar-worship.37 The remnants of
the Orthodox icon corner was transitioned to a Red Corner (krasnyi ugolok) by the Red
Army starting in 1921 but after Lenin's death, it was referred to as the Lenin Corner.38
Lenin as lofty leader and Russian prophet of Marx became the secular religion in the
wake of the cultural void left by the removal of religious customs.39
Stalin served as the main puppeteer in orchestrating both the funeral and
personality cult of Lenin and scholars hypothesized that Stalin’s training at the Tiflis
Theological Seminary provided him with knowledge of imagery's power, perhaps
inspired him to incorporate religious overtones in the orchestration of Lenin’s
posthumous cult.40 Immediately following Lenin’s death, Stalin organized the Central
Committee directions on how the production of Lenin imagery was to be distributed
utilizing posters, busts, photographs, banners and all types of public art.41 All artwork
was controlled through the Committee for the Immortalization of Lenin’s Memory
headed by V. Molotov. The four major printing houses of Moscow and Leningrad and
the Association of Artists of the Revolution (AkhR) produced portraits of Lenin and by
1929, a reported 12.5 million copies were in circulation.42
The cult of Mao developed in a similar pattern to Stalin's cult although Mao had
the added Lenin effect as the Chinese prophet for Marxism. Like Stalin, Mao was able to
develop and orchestrate his cult with the cooperation of the Party. The Red Guard (PLA)
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is responsible for the promotion and implementation, as they were deemed the only
ideologically correct organization by Mao.43 Lin Biao, as head of the Red Guard, was
particularly responsible for fanning Mao’s cult along with Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, who
was also pivotal in the development of propaganda art. During the Cultural Revolution,
Jiang worked closely with the PLA propaganda committees on ideological direction for
the visual arts.44 Most poster art produced during this time came from state sanctioned
propaganda units but some were produced and independently funded by independent Red
Guards, to act as examples of patriotism.45 The Red Guard was also involved in
implementing the “Destroy the Four Olds” campaign which destroyed traditional
religious altars and imagery, replacing them with images of Mao. This domestic
infiltration combined with powerful symbolism such as the sun and use of the color red,
elevated the cult of Mao to religious proportions.46
Despite strong similarities between policies and personality cults of Stalin and
Mao, their posthumous cults take markedly different paths. Stalin's promotion of Lenin's
cult fueled his own grips on power, but Stalin's successors were not as fond of him as
Stalin was for his forefather, Lenin. In the aftermath of Stalin’s reign, Nikita Khrushchev
attempted to right the wrongs of the former era and put an end to Soviet extremism by
publicly denouncing Stalin in the “Secret Speech” of 1956 to the 20th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately for Khrushchev, this move would
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lead to both his undoing as well as uprisings and instability in the Eastern bloc. 47
Following Khrushchev's Secret Speech, Stalin was removed from his place alongside
Lenin and buried deeply yet modestly in a nearby land plot and even Stalingrad, the site
of Stalin's 1943 victory over the Nazis invasion, was renamed Volgograd.48
While Khrushchev was bold enough to criticize his predecessor, he possessed
foresight enough to see the danger in critiquing the father of the revolution, Lenin. Close
proximity to Leninist philosophies and motives were still necessary in achieving
legitimacy in Soviet Russia. As a result of the Secret Speech, the term cult of personality
took on a negative association and became linked with the excesses of the Stalinist
regime, yet this negative connotation was never directed towards Lenin. Even in
contemporary times, Lenin's following within the Russian population is never described
or viewed as a “cult” as this term is reserved for descriptions of Stalin.49 In fact, Lenin’s
cult experienced a resurgence in the post-Stalin era, as Lenin was still held in high regard
and as founder of the party and renewed praise of him was thought to bolster
legitimacy.50
While Soviet culture waited only three years to criticize and publicly demote
Stalin's legacy, Mao remains in high regard within Chinese society and remains the
historical icon for modern China. Perhaps the Chinese learned from Khrushchev's
mistakes at the dangers of overtly criticizing former powerful leaders, as the Chinese
have continued Mao's cult in a style quite similar to Soviet handling of Lenin's legacy.
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As the prophet and leader of China's revolution, Mao resembles Lenin as a founder for
the modern communist regime, although Mao did enact disastrous policies and purges
similar to that of Stalin. Just as a high regard for Lenin proved essential to Soviet
legitimacy, promoting a favorable legacy of Mao continues to be beneficial, if not
necessary for the Chinese Communist party. Mao's image currently remains on every
denomination of the Chinese yuan banknotes. Mao's portrait hangs in the same spot in
Tiananmen Square the Communist leader declared the People's Republic in 1949. He
deliberately chose this location to invoke its symbolic value as the historic capital of the
Chinese empire since the fifth century B.C.E.51 Directly opposite the portrait's watchful
eye sits the mausoleum of Mao, which continues to be the only location in the Square
open freely to the public.52
Although neither embalmed or immortalized within a mausoleum, Pol Pot's
legacy lives on in a faceless fashion similar to the manner of his anti-cult while alive. His
funeral pyre, although marked and protected by the Cambodian government, remains
unadorned amidst a field in a remote northern province. The site draws some curious
tourists or victims seeking atonement, but their numbers remain few. The predominant
marker and visual legacy of Pol Pot's regime remains the S-21 Prison. The site's
transformation into a memorial began with the Vietnamese almost immediately after its
discovery shortly after their invasion in 1979.53 Certain of the site's historical
importance, as well as its potential propaganda value, Vietnamese officials closed off the
complex to sanitize it and examine materials, such as files and confessions, found at the
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site. By March of 1979, Mai Lam, a Vietnamese colonel who was fluent in Khmer and
had extensive museology and legal experience, began organizing the documents and
transforming the facility into a museum of genocide. When it opened to the public in
1980, a Cambodian survivor of S-21, Ung Pech, served as the museum's director.54
The new Vietnamese government asked Vann Nath to paint a series depicting life
at S-21 under the Khmer Rouge for permanent display to be hung within the Tuol Sleng
facility which was turned into the Museum of Genocide.55 Vann Nath has contributed
enormously to the legacy of Tuol Sleng and the cultural memory of Cambodia by
depicting what occurred there. He states in his autobiography: “Contributing to the
establishment of this Genocide Museum was the most meaningful thing I have ever done.
Only a handful of people who had known the taste and flavor of this prison had
survived.”56 Vann Nath's work for the Genocide Museum proved to be a monumental
task for the artist. He admits when first approached about helping with the museum, “the
idea of returning to that horrifying place filled me with dread.”57 He was commissioned
with free reign to paint scenes of life at S-21 and he painted both what he witnessed
himself and experiences described to him by fellow victims of the regime, yet no images
of Pol Pot were included. While the busts of Pol Pot produced at the prison complex
remain on display, Vann Nath's work from that time is unaccounted for.58
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While working on a 1996 documentary film project, Vann Nath’s path crossed
with a former S-21 chief security guard and after confronting him, questioned if he had
seen his paintings in the museum, “What do you think of the paintings? Are they too
exaggerated?” Vann asked. The former guard replied, “No, they are not exaggerated.
There were scenes more brutal than that.”59 In the closing chapter of his autobiography,
Vann Nath mentions the debates surrounding the horrific nature of the Tuol Sleng
Museum. As a primary attraction for tourists to Cambodia, some criticize the museum for
reinforcing negative associations of the genocide with Cambodian culture more
generally.60 Vann Nath is adamant that the museum should remain open to the public
stating, “I want to keep the memory alive so foreign visitors and the new generation of
Cambodians can understand what happened during that time …”61 Vann Nath's paintings
for the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum and his role as a survivor made him a cultural icon
of both Cambodian art and the Khmer struggle.
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Devastated Utopias: Contemporary Art & a Global Market

“Opposition is the movement of the Dao.”1

In the Soviet Union, the years following Stalin's death generated a political and
cultural thaw which allowed an influx of Western art, products and culture into the
country. Western commercial symbols, such as Coca Cola or Marlboro, became wildly
recognizable and popular. Artists were particularly inspired and influenced by this new
wellspring of ideas. Soviet nonconformist, or non-official, artists of the 1960s began
embracing modernism in attempts to reject the official style of Socialist Realism. By the
1970s, a new artistic style emerged in reaction to the strict guidelines of Socialist
Realism and exposure to Western Pop Art. Although Pop Art was not the current
movement in the United States, the style's flexibility in regards to what can be deemed
art appealed to Soviet artists.2 The name Sots Art combines the Russian pronunciation of
the term soc as used for Socialist Realism or sotsrealism with the American stylistic
name, Pop Art, from which it was inspired.3
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Aspects of Russian culture combined to create the thought-provoking irony that
characterizes Sots Art. By the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Party became increasingly
identified as a means to receive perks, such as Western consumer goods and ability to
travel abroad. The reality of Soviet daily life contained an apparent irony, as the
popularity of Western commercial goods increased exponentially with time. The
stagnation of the Leonid Brezhnev years from 1964-1982 bred disillusionment within the
Soviet regime, and Russian culture began to display a blasphemous outlook in regards to
the government. Sarcastic and lewd jokes mocking Soviet slogans, leaders and rituals
became common and popular within Russian culture. Reflecting these cultural
sentiments, Sots Artists portrayed the ironic reality of Soviet life through combinations
of Russian ideological symbols and consumer goods, presented in an unusual,
unexpected or obscene scenario.4
Sots Art was founded by Vitaly Komar and Alexander Melamid who graduated
from the Stroganov Institute of Design in Moscow in 1967. Like most Soviet artists, they
earned a living by creating propaganda art for the public sphere. While working for a
Soviet youth organization in 1972 making slogans and posters, the artists became
infatuated with the idea of turning their routine art into something deeper and more
significant.5 After learning that a huge bust of Stalin was buried in the grounds outside
their workspace, the two artists began pondering childhood memories of Stalin’s era,
“long buried in their unconscious.”6 One of their earliest works entitled Double Self-
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Portrait from 1973 (fig. 31) showed the artists’ self-portraits in profile, posed similarly
to mosaic depictions of Lenin and Stalin in the Moscow subway.7

Figure 31. Komar & Melamid. Double Self Portrait, 1974.

Komar and Melamid viewed Socialist Realism as part of the Russian artistic
legacy along with religious iconography of Russian Orthodoxy. A primary purpose of
Sots Art was to expose the contradictions within Russian culture while ironically playing
7
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with those visual legacies. The juxtaposition of Soviet ideology with Orthodox
iconography often created “highly irreverent, carnivalistic use of Christian images,” as
critic Boris Greys describes.8 The generation of Komar and Melamid knew what it was to
live in a closed society where one was forced “to embrace absurdity as reality” and Pop
Art was appealing in its ability to portray the absurd in a humorous tone.9 Komar and
Melamid also enjoyed pointing out that their art highlighted the comparison of “Western
overproduction of goods and the Soviet overproduction of ideology.”10
In order to produce their art without fear of persecution, many Sots Artists
relocated to New York from Moscow in the 1970s. Alexander Kosolapov, a sculptor
turned painter, emigrated to New York in 1975, firm in his belief that Sots Art
development was impossible in the Soviet Union because of its potentially dangerous
social critiques and blasphemous portrayals. In the United States, Sots Art was viewed as
highly political and American audiences initially found the style unappealing due to “an
antagonism towards communist iconography at an unconscious level.” The first exhibit
of Sots Art occurred in 1986 at the New Museum of Contemporary Art in New York and
featured works by Komar, Melamid and Kosolapov. By the late 1990s, interest and
demand for Sots Art increased as the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet
Union eased tensions and created sentiments of nostalgia for the imagery of the now
bygone era.11
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Alexander Kosolapov achieved the greatest success and notoriety of the Sots
Artists; his work took the ideas and styles originated by Komar and Melamid to new
levels of irony and popularity. Utilizing popular Western brands like Coca Cola and
McDonald's as well as visual staples of Russian culture such as images of Lenin and
religious iconography, Kosolapov exposed a binary realm of ideas such as: the collective
and personal, the vulgar and sacred, the political and taboo. Kosolapov marks his initial
interest in Sots Art as beginning around 1973 when he pondered the problems of social
and cultural change in Russia. In an interview, the artist explained his work and thought
processes by stating that his generation were: “ … children of that culture which, having
experienced temptation by revolution, the collapse of its illusions, and social upheavals,
was reborn into a postmodern culture, partly iconoclastic, partly cynical and
pragmatically market-driven.”12 Kosolapov's work came to represent this “collapse of
illusion” and the predominance of Western brand symbols reflected Russia's growing
appetite for consumer goods.
The economic climate of the Soviet Union contributed to the development of Sots
Art. The lack of any Soviet art market along with restriction from the elitist Western art
markets meant artists only had access to markets of cheap goods for mass consumption.
Through the influence of Western Pop Art, Russian artists discovered a transformation
for the ordinary commodity into valuable work of art. By relocating to capitalist New
York, Sots Artists gained access to a rapidly expanding contemporary art market which
encouraged artists' commercialization of Soviet ideology. The widely known Soviet
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iconography and its implied ideology were crafted into profitable commodities along
with other vestiges of Russia's artistic heritage such as Orthodox iconography.13
As Sots Art is admittedly indebted to its stylistic predecessors, the purposes of
these former styles, particularly the most recent, Socialist Realism, bear considerable
influence on the deeper themes of Sots Art. Socialist Realism strove to portray the ideal,
a utopian society and as a result, the style was less concerned with the present and more
interested in visions of the future. Art critics hypothesize that Sots Art depicts the ironic
reality that was the Soviet Union of the 1970s-1980s, but perhaps Russian artists meant
to utilize the futuristic goals of the Socialist Realism legacy to depict a new idea. By
displaying a blend of artistic trends with the contemporary ironic reality, Sots Art depicts
the new utopia for Russian society: consumerism.

13

Groys, “Eastern Prophecies,” 10-11.

75

Figure 32. Alexander Kosolapov. McLenin's, 1991. Digital image for lightbox.

Figure 33. Alexander Kosolapov. This is my blood. This is my body, 2001. Digital Print..
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Similar to the Russian situation after Stalin's death, the demise of Mao triggered a
political thaw which allowed an influx of Western influence into China. Following Mao's
death in September of 1976 and the official end of the Cultural Revolution by the
Eleventh Party Congress in 1977, political and economic reforms enacted under Deng
Xiaoping created a safer environment for Chinese freedom of expression. By 1978, art
schools were reopened and art magazines were restored and allowed to feature classical
Chinese, contemporary Japanese and Western art. As a result, academic art began
making moves to differentiate itself from propaganda art and by 1979, contemporary
Chinese art began to emerge through unofficial public exhibitions.14
In 1983, the Propaganda Department began an anti-spiritual pollution campaign
in reaction to a fear that the Open Door policy may have allowed in potentially damaging
ideas. Exhibitions of Western modern art were suspended or canceled, but these actions
had the reverse effect intended, piquing the interests of young Chinese artists in this now
re-forbidden apple of expression. Reproductions and private exhibitions of Western art
exploded in the mid 1980s and Western art theory was translated and published. Exhibits
by Robert Rauschenberg in 1985 had a profound effect on how Chinese artists began
viewing art. Young Chinese artists devoured the new material, consuming and re-staging
Western movements in a fraction of the time.15
By 1985, a loosely bound art group known as the ’85 Art New Wave movement
formed with artists who were knowledgeable in Western art and theory; these artists held
a common goal to revolutionize Chinese art. The artist Wang Guangyi, a member of the
faction Northern Art Group, emerged as one of the most influential and successful artists
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from this group. His essay, “We – Participants of the ’85 Art Movement’” from 1986
declares that this group of artists opposes both “all things unhealthy and detrimental to
the evolution of life” as well as “morbid rococo styles of art” and seeks to produce art
which serves as a “prophesy [of] a new culture.” 16 Wang also likened the ’85 Art
Movement to the European Renaissance, as both movements prompted a departing “from
difficult conditions … to discover humanity and the value of human nature.”17
One of the earliest contemporary styles known as Scar Art reflected a new
sensitivity and realism by displaying the harmful effects of the Cultural Revolution on
the average citizen. By the mid 1980s, the image of Mao emerged as major subject
among contemporary artists who now often depicted the late leader in ambiguous or
satirical forms. Western Pop Art served as the main inspiration for these artists,
particularly Andy Warhol's series of Mao from 1973 (fig. 34) and Rauschenberg's 1985
exhibit, which were well known to Chinese artists by the 1980s thanks to the Open Door
Policy. Expanding on these ideas, Chinese artists began depicting Mao, familiar
propaganda imagery and ironic realities such as the voracious Chinese appetite for
consumerism.18
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Figure 34. Andy Warhol. Mao, 1973. Acrylic and silkscreen on canvas. 448.3 x
346.7 cm.

In the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, Chinese art of the 1990s
developed a more somber and cynical tone. After the government banned unofficial
activities such contemporary art publications or exhibitions, young Chinese artists faced
their “impotence in the face of real politics … [and] turned to sarcasm.”19
Simultaneously, contemporary Chinese art began gaining international recognition,
which altered the relationship between Chinese artists and their audience. Pop Art
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became a preferred style as a “most direct and most sensitive medium for representing
changes” as it was thought to be useful as a barometer of the artists’ psyche.20 The use of
Pop Art was identified by Chinese critics as having, “great use of visual signs so familiar
to the public that they are tacitly understood … The search for metaphors in reality …
[artists use] a canvas to unleash a certain defiant mocking of authority … [with] graphic
simplicity and quick execution.”21
Two variations on Pop Art emerged in China to great critical and commercial
success: Political Pop and Cynical Realism. These stylistic twins are both firmly situated
in reality yet focused on “the dissolution of certain systems of meaning.”22 Contemporary
Chinese Pop Art, usually referred to as Political Pop, started combined images from the
Cultural Revolution with iconic symbols from a now booming marketplace in the
1990s.23 The emergence of Political Pop is significant for Chinese art history in that it
marks the adaptation Western artistic ideas towards the essence of Chinese existence.
With hints of humor, Political Pop visualizes “deconstructing the self and one’s
psychological complex toward politics.”24
One artist in particular can be credited with spawning the direction of Chinese
Political Pop as well as producing some of the earliest Chinese parodies of Mao's image.
Wang Guangyi’s 1986-8 “Mao Zedong” series (fig. 35) and his ongoing series “Great
Criticism” begun in the 1990s, combine images taken directly from propaganda poster
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art of the Cultural Revolution with Western capitalist symbols. The critical and
commercial success of these works cemented Wang as the founding father of Political
Pop.25 Wang borrows heavily from Cultural Revolutionary art as this served as a major
facet in his upbringing and artistic development. Born in 1957, he was required to draw
propaganda images as a schoolboy and as a teenager spent four years in an ideological
rehabilitation facility, eventually being placed as a railroad worker by the government at
age twenty. At the close of the Cultural Revolution, Wang enrolled in the Zhejiang
Academy of Fine Arts to begin his artistic training and graduated in 1984.

Figure 35. Wang Guangyi. Mao. 1988. Oil on canvas.
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Particularly exemplary and lauded are Wang’s Great Criticism from 1990. At the
“First 1990s Biennial Art Fair” in 1992, Wang received the highest award in Chinese
academic art: the Document Award. Comments supplementing the award praised the
works as “one of the best examples … to arise” in which the artist “opened up a
contemporary problem” using “familiar historical forms … deftly linked to what were
once irreconcilable popular contemporary icons, sending a hopelessly tangled
metaphysical problem into suspension.”26 Wang’s portrayal was the first to reintroduce
the image of Mao into the fine arts sphere, as the image had been “silenced” for many
years due the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, yet Mao's influence remained a
permanent stamp on contemporary Chinese society. 27 Wang’s use of imagery from the
Cultural Revolution hit on an elephant in the room for the Chinese people, proving
provocative yet laudable by Chinese and Western audiences alike. The legacy of Mao
was imprinted in Chinese society through his deification and symbol as modern China's
revolutionary figure, yet the destruction and societal disruption of his radical policies
remained impossible to deny. Nevertheless, Mao's regime enabled the immense
improvement of many Chinese lives and rapid development of the country, endearing
Mao's memory to the masses despite his flaws and errors.
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Figure 36. Wang Guangyi. Great Criticism – Coca Cola. Oil on canvas.

Figure 37. Wang Guangyi. Great Criticism – Art and People, 2005. Oil on
canvas. 200 x 300 cm.
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Figure 38. Wang Guangyi. Great Criticism – Art and Power, 2005-2006. Oil on
canvas. 300 x 600 cm.

While Political Pop embraced Western modern art languages such as Pop art,
certain artists chose to reinvent realism and elevate it beyond its previous boundaries.
While the Revolutionary Realism of post-1949 borrowed heavily from Soviet motifs and
the Cultural Revolution Realism sought to give subjects notes of religious idealism, the
post-1989 development of Cynical Realism sought to expose “the current collective
psychological state of loss and apathy.” The reality within this realism is “disparaged,
ridiculed, and mocked” by the artists. 28 The artist deemed responsible for the Cynical
Realism movement is Yue Minjun. His signature style consisted of laughing faces that
seemingly refused to take life too seriously. This motif displayed a mockery of authority
coupled with a boredom for everyday life.29
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Yue Minjun grew up during the Cultural Revolution and worked as an electrician
for the state and teacher prior to studying painting at the Heibei Normal University in
1985. A notable figure of Beijing's thriving Yuanmingyuan artist colony, Yue Minjun
affirms that his paintings are a reflection of himself, but insists he doesn't produce art in
order to part of any school or movement. Rather, Yue Minjun paints in attempts, “to
make sense of the world.”30 Like many Chinese, he admits to a sense of disillusionment
particularly after the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, explaining, “I was very down. I realized
the gap between reality and the ideal …”31 The eternally and stubbornly smiling faces of
his work bear influences of Daoist scholars who would often give up in the face of
hopeless situations or choose to seal their vision from the horrors and violence of this
world.32 Art critics share opinion that Yue Minjun's paintings reflect a Daoist perspective,
but the artist himself remains characteristically ambiguous by stating, “A smile doesn't
necessarily mean happiness; it could be something else.”33
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Figure 39. Yue Minjun. Execution, 1995. Oil on canvas, 150 x 300 cm.

Figure 40. Yue Minjun. Salute, 2005. Oil on canvas. 170 x 140 cm.
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In Cambodia, there was not a sense of disillusionment in the fall of the communist
regime but rather a desire for atonement and justice for the toll of Democratic
Kampuchea's policies. Initially the period directly following the Vietnamese overthrow
of the Khmer Rouge was occupied with stabilizing Cambodian society and the economy.
The few remaining artists found employment in art production for the new Vietnamese
regime. Pech Song's talent and knowledge of Cambodia's cartography made him an
invaluable asset to the invading Vietnamese army whose maps were outdated and
inaccurate. Pech Song was relocated back to Phnom Penh after the invasion's success and
he worked under the Vietnamese regime in the publicity department, once again
producing roadside posters concerning health awareness, support for new government
and productivity. Pech Song was also commissioned to paint a number of communist
leader portraits such as Ho Chi Minh and Lenin, which were hung in government
buildings and offices. These commissions were a result of Vietnamese communist art
policy, which closely followed the Soviet-Chinese model of Socialist Realism.34
Into the late twentieth century, the audience and market for Cambodian art
remained extremely low. Art production relied almost exclusively on commissions from
the government or tourist purchases; very little artistic activity reflected the recent Khmer
Rouge atrocities or ongoing attempts to achieve a sense of justice. The lack of an art
market also contributed to limited contemporary Cambodian art production. Although
exhibits developed and promoted by Ingrid Muan's Reyum Institute tended to price art
modestly (at just a few hundred dollars), they often failed to sell any pieces. The low
demand caused Cambodian artists to produce art only for practical reasons.

34

“Pech Song: Art as Real Reality”
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The dark legacy of the past caused rifts between younger and older contemporary
Cambodian artists. Many young generation Khmer returned to Cambodia by the late
1980s and early 1990s, after completing their education abroad. Their art reflected their
experiences and exposures, and it was often criticized by the older generation artists who
remained in Cambodia and suffered under the Khmer Rouge. The older generation artists
tended to produce artwork for foreign tourists, and consistently their work depicted the
popular Angkor temple motif (fig. 41). The younger artists' preference for more abstract,
Western styles was criticized by many of the older artists as “not Khmer.”35
With the exception of exhibition pieces, the bulk of Pech Song's art depicts scenes
from ancient Angkor. The artist explains his subject choice and silence on the Khmer
Rouge effect as, “People don't want to buy paintings about those things. Those
experiences aren't beautiful. Real life isn't beautiful. People want to buy beautiful
paintings so at least the inside of their houses can look good.” When commissioned by a
new contemporary art gallery, Pech Song created five canvases depicting life under the
regimes he personally witnessed during his lifetime. The series ended with a scene of
Pech Song's depiction of contemporary Cambodia but did not include a visionary future
for Khmer culture. When questioned as to the omission, Pech Song answered that if such
a painting existed, he hoped it to be “really beautiful.”36
When the Reyum Institute in Phnom Penh received Rockefeller Foundation funds
in 2000 to support an exhibit of Cambodian art, pieces were produced for the Rockefeller
“Legacy Program.” Artwork was selected from post-traumatic cultures such as Cambodia
and Rwanda to tour and exhibit internationally. Cambodian pieces were markedly silent
35

Jeff Smith, “Cambodian Art Seeks a Market: Art Enthusiasts Seek to 'Break the Cycle' Keeping
Cambodian Art Hidden,” The Cambodian Daily, December 12, 1998.
36

Pech Song quoted in “Pech Song: Art as Reality,” Angkor, July-September 1999.
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on imagery depicting the Khmer Rouge or the lasting effect on Cambodian society, and
the exhibit was entitled, “Legacy of Absence.” The younger, Western trained artists
focused on unconventional artistic materials and techniques. Vann Nath produced a piece
entitled The Village of my Birth (fig. 42) as part of the exhibition, which depicted of a
farmer playing a flute among peacefully grazing cows. Although Vann Nath produced
the graphic series of life under the Khmer Rouge for the Tuol Sleng series, this task was
emotionally grueling for him, and when given freedom of subject matter, he preferred to
depict an idyllic scene. The effects of the Khmer Rouge were so devastating on
Cambodian society, many choose to cope from the past trauma by focusing on visions of
a peaceful future.37

Figure 41. Pech Song. Late 20th century. Oil on canvas. Diptych.
37

Victoria Stagg Elliot, “Cambodian Artists Explore Legacy of Pol Pot's Regime,” Cambodia
Daily, January 11, 2000.
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.
Figure 42. Vann Nath. The village of my birth,1998. Oil on canvas. 210 x 132 cm.

Conclusion

Although developing later and to greater notoriety, Chinese Political Pop is quite
similar to Russian Sots Art in its incompatible and ironic juxtaposition of communist,
religious or commercial iconography. Western Pop Art theory appealed greatly to late
Soviet and post-Mao China in its embrace of the average and the flexibility of what can
be called art. Both Russian and Chinese societies rapidly progressed into consumer
cultures, which was followed by general sentiments of disillusionment at the failure of
the communist system. Artists strove to depict this national sense of lost identity and
ideals. Traditions of religion emerge in both Russian and Chinese genres of Pop Art,
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exemplified through Kosolapov's use of Orthodox iconography and Yue Minjun's
personal icon of an unseeing, widely grinning face which reflects the ongoing Daoist
influence within contemporary Chinese society.
In Sots Art and Chinese Pop Art, artists struggle with a loss of identity which
displays itself as an amalgamation of past legacies. Russian Sots artists working in the
United States felt a sense of displacement due to the stress of relocation and disillusioned
sentiments regarding the validity of communist ideology. In attempts to assert their
Russian heritage and uniqueness in this new land, they exemplified the vestiges of their
artistic heritage, such as Orthodox iconography and Socialist Realism. In attempts to
makes sense of their Soviet reality, these artists needed to dethrone the implemented
ideal promoted by Socialist Realism. In toppling this manufactured utopia, Sots Artists
depicted a realistic aspect of their Russian culture: an ironic clashing of Soviet ideology
with a mass consumerist desire. Although regarded as a blasphemous defamation of
Soviet culture, the artists, in fact, depicted an aspect of Russia's reality. Yet in depicting
this sense, the heritage of Socialist Realism's quest for a utopia continued to influence
these artists. They simultaneously continued their artistic heritage while depicting the
new ideal for their society: consumerism.
Just as the work of Sots Art depicted a crisis of identity, Chinese Pop Art also
reflected the problematic issues of a clear contemporary Chinese identity and its
symptoms emerged in the prevalent portrayals of Mao. The political legacy of Mao
coupled with a sense of individual impotency in the face of governmental power made
for a widespread sense of disillusionment. A cultural confusion emerged as to how to
reflect their heritage in an increasingly global, consumer culture. The image of Mao
remained a popular subject for Chinese artists struggling with their place in the modern
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communist regime and the ambiguous, sarcastic manner in which Mao is portrayed
reflects the many ironies of Chinese contemporary society. The contemporary Chinese
struggle consists of a desire to reason with the past and dream for a future.
Symbols of consumerism are predominant in many styles of contemporary
Chinese art and Political Pop utilized them to great effectiveness as demonstrated in
Wang Guangyi's extensive “Great Criticism” series. Wang's juxtaposition of propaganda
iconography and popular consumer goods also reflected the irony of modern China. The
fierce outward gaze and determination reminiscent of PRC's struggle appeared futile and
cartoon-like under the implications of a Western consumer brands. Yet these
incompatible, ironic combinations reflected a desire of the contemporary society. Like
their Russian precursors, Chinese Pop art retained the futuristic aspect of Socialist
Realism while promoting the new utopia for Chinese culture: the consumerist world.
Cambodian society in the years following communism's demise also suffered
from crises of identity. Cambodian artists battled to define a uniquely Khmer artistic
style which reflected their society's unclear cultural identity. Portrayals of Angkor
remained popular and frequently depicted as they provided a clear heritage of the Khmer
identity. The loss of independence and instability which historically plagued Cambodia's
development climaxed under the nationalistic destruction of the Khmer Rouge, and
contemporary Cambodian artists remained unclear on how to depict or reflect the effects.
They hoped for a tranquil future, although their visions of a utopia remained foggy under
the haze of the past's unhealed wounds. In attempting to visualize and dream of a utopian
future, they turned to a glorious past, long before an ethnically Khmer regime devoured
more of their essence than any previous foreign power. Contemporary Cambodian artists
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continued to glorify their medieval heritage as it was the only clear and idyllic motif their
recent history afforded them.
For the study of history and comprehension of contemporary society, art provides
a unique tool with which to measure and analyze cultural development. As a tide of
events and influences continues to flow throughout the world, art production provides a
visual record of a culture's heritage, values and outlook. The global rise of Marxism
affected the development of art enormously, and its Socialist Realism perspective
inspired interpretations and visions of a utopia. The demise of communism in Russia,
China and Camboda altered the heritage, values and idealism within each of these
cultures according to their own historical experiences. As these societies continue to
develop amidst rising globalization, their cultures will continue to adapt individually to
the transient nature of life.
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